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Excerpt from TOKYO RECORD, by Otto D. Tolischus,  
1943, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York

Pages 39, 40, 41

February 19, (1941)

About a dozen persons sat down to luncheon at Matsuoka's official residence. Most of them were members of the Foreign Office. Byas, Karl H. von Wiegand of the Hearst newspapers, who had just arrived from Shanghai, and myself were the only foreign guests. The residence, an old fashioned and almost dingy foreign-style house, was furnished in undistinguished Western bourgeois taste.

Matsuoka, brisk, self-confident and loquacious, was very much interested in the German situation and asked many questions regarding it. I told him about strict regimentation and rationing in Germany and remarked how much easier things appeared in Japan.

"Oh," he laughed, "you can't regiment the Japanese like you can the Germans."

\* \* \* \* \*

Put in a nutshell, Matsuoka proposed that President Roosevelt should "advise" Chiang Kai-shek to enter into direct peace negotiations with Matsuoka, and should back up this "advice" with the threat of cutting off future American aid to Chungking. In return, Matsuoka hinted that he was prepared to give Chiang Kai-shek better peace terms than Wang Ching-wei had been able to obtain and he pledged himself in particular to get all Japanese troops out of China after peace was restored.

"Something must be done to stop this war," he declared. "The longer it lasts, the more it plays into the hands of the Bolsheviks."

Japan, he suggested, was immune from Bolshevism, but he feared that it would continue to spread in China.

"I suppose that's the idea behind Japan's mediation offer yesterday," I suggested.

Matsuoka looked blank and protested that he did not know about any mediation offer. He thought there must be some misunderstanding somewhere. We could only smile.

"What about Wang Ching-wei?" he was asked.

"Wang Ching-wei," he replied, "is a patriot, and if necessary he will sacrifice himself for his country."

"I know Chiang Kai-shek," he continued, "and I have great respect for him. I know we can get to terms once we get talking about a settlement."

Pages 39, 40, 41 (continued)

This was enlightening. So Matsuoka realized that peace in China could come only through Chiang Kai-shek, and was willing to drop his puppet.

"What about the alliance with Germany and Italy?" I asked. "America feels very strongly about it."

Matsuoka looked up sharply. Then he said:

"I wrote that treaty myself and I conducted all the final negotiations with the Germans. I know just what that treaty means. And I can tell you that there is nothing in that treaty compelling Japan to go to war in the Pacific. I told the Germans so, and they accepted my interpretation. We'll decide for ourselves what we are going to do."

"Ah," I thought, "a proviso I did not know about."

"But will the Army agree?" I ventured to suggest.

Matsuoka played with his mustache.

"Well," he finally replied, "it's a question of personal trust. I am willing to stake my whole political career on this. If I should fail, I would withdraw from politics entirely. But if President Roosevelt would only trust me, I can guarantee that I will not fail."

His whole policy, he protested, was aimed at preserving peace. "That's why we excluded Russia from the operation of the Tripartite Pact," he said, "so as not to arouse apprehensions in Moscow. And that is why we are so anxious for the United States to stay out of the war."

"Something must be done to stop this war," he declared. "The longer it lasts, the more it lays into the hands of the Bolsheviks."

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辯護口實類

オット・デイトリス著「東京レコード」ヨリノ抜萃

一九四三年版・ニューヨーク・レナル・エンド・ヒツチヨツタ社

一九四一年（昭和十六年）二月十九日。

約十二名松岡氏官邸ニ於テ午餐ノ席ニ就イタ。

此等人士の大部分ハ外務省省員デアツタ。外國人トシテノ賓客ハ、上海、カラ、歸京シタバカリノ「ハースト」新聞ノ「カール・エイチ・バイアス・フォン・ウキーガン」氏ト私トダゲアツタ。官邸ハ舊式ノ洋館デ大分汚レタ建物、家具造作ハ普通ノ样式デ「ブルジョア」風ノモノデアツタ。

松岡氏ハ活潑、自信満々、且ツ鋭舌デアツタガ、獨逸ノ時局事變ニ大イニ興味ヲ持チ、ソレニ關シテ種々ノ質問ヲ發シタ。

私ハ獨逸ノ内ノ嚴密ナル組織化及ビ配給制ニ關シテ述べ、且ツ獨逸ニ比



シテ日本デハ萬事が遙カニ榮デアルヨウデアルト彼ニ語ツタ。

彼笑ツテ曰ク、「日本人ハ、獨逸人ノヤウニハ組織化スルコトハ出来ナイ」。

松岡氏ノ提案ヲ要約シテ言ヘバ、「ローズベルト大統領ガ蔣介石ニ對シテ松岡自身トノ直接和平交渉開始ヲ「勸告」シ、且ツ將來ニ於ケル米國ノ對重慶政府援助中止ヲ以テ威嚇シ、以テコノ「勸告」ノ實施ヲ促スベキデアル」。

松岡氏ハ之レガ代價トシテ、蔣介石ニ對シ、汪兆銘ガ獲得シ得ル和平條件ヨリモ有利ナル條件ヲ提供スルノ用意ガアルトノ意味ヲ表現シ、且ツ又平和克復後ハ中國カラ日本軍隊ヲ全部引上ゲルコトヲ特ニ固ク誓約シタ。

松岡氏曰ク、「コノ戦争ヲ停止スルタノニハ何トカ手段ヲ講ジナケレバナラヌ。戦争ガ長引ケバ長引ク程、ロシヤ共産黨ノ利益ヲ謀ルコトニナル」ト。

松岡氏ハ、日本ハ共産主義ニハ感樂シナイト思フガ、中國ニハソレガ

今後共依然トシテ延漫シテ行クト思フト氣遣シゲニ云ツタ。

ソノ時ハ私ハ日ツタ、「昨日日本ガ提出シタ調停申出ノ背後ニアル動念ハ恐ラクソノ點デアラウト私ハ思フ」。

松岡氏ハ無表情ナ様子デ、調停申出ナドトハ自分ハ何モ知ラナイ所デアルト斷言シタ。何處カニ何カシラ誤解ガアルニ相違ナイト思フト彼ハ云ツタ。私等ハタゞ微笑チ浮ベルダゲデアツタ。

「浜光銘ハドウナノデスカ」トノ質問チ松岡ニ尋ネタ。

松岡氏ハ答ヘテ云フニハ「浜光銘ハ愛國ノ士デアアル、彼ハ必要トナレバ國家ノタメニナラバ犠牲ニナルコトヲ辞シナイ」ト。

更ニ松岡氏ハ言葉ヲ續ケテ云フニハ「私ハ蔣介石チ知ツテキル、私ハ大ヒニ彼ヲ尊敬シテキル。吾々ハ和解交渉ヲ進メルコトガ出來ル、コレ

ハ自分ニハ解ツテキル。」

コノ言葉ハ我々ニハ啓蒙的デアツタ。ソレデ松岡氏ハ中國ノ平和ハ蔣介石チ通ジテノミ采ルモノデアアルコトヲ認識シ且ツ傀儡タル人物トノ關係チ絶ツ積リデアツタノデアル。

私ハ松岡氏ニ問フタ「獨逸トノ同盟ハドウデアルカ。

アメリカハ此ノ同盟ニ關シテハ強度ノ關心ヲ抱イテキル。」

松岡氏ハ急ニ顔ヲ上ゲ而シテ云フニハ「アノ條約ハ私が自分デ書イタ  
ノデアリ、獨逸トノ最後の交渉ハ凡テ私ガソレニ當ツタ。アノ條約ガ何  
ンナモノデアルカハ私ノヨク知ツテアルトコロデアル。且ツ私ハ斷言シ  
得ルガ、アノ條約ニハ日本ヲシテ太平洋ニ於テ戰爭ヲシナケレバナラナ  
クサセル様ナ事柄ハ一ツモ余マレテハナイ。」

私ハ獨逸ニ對シテソウ云ツテ置イタ、而シテ獨逸モ亦私ノソノ解釋ヲ承  
認シタノデアアル。我々ノ將來ノ行動ハ吾々自身デ斷々ニ決メルノデアル

ト。私ハ思ツタ「ハハ、コレハ自分ノ知ラナカッタ但シ舊的條件デアッタ」

ト。松岡氏ハ此ノ點ヲ「實成シマスカ」ト私ハ思ヒ切ツテ云ツタ。

松岡ハ口移シチヒネツテキタガ。日本ハ獨逸トノ同盟ヲ申出、獨逸ハ  
遂ニ次ノヨウニ答エタ。我々ハ獨逸ニ對シテハ、獨逸ハ我々ニ對シテハ、

「ソウデスネ」

ソレハ個人的信用ノ問題デアル。コノ問題ニハ自分ノ全政治的生涯ヲモ。コノ問題  
時スルコトヲ断シナイ積リデアル。

萬一ニモ失敗ニ移レバ政界カラ全面的ニ引退スル。大體ニハ政界カラ全面的ニ引退  
シシロズベルト大統領ガ自分ヲ信用シテ呉レサヘスレバ必ず私ハ失敗ヲ冒用シ  
スル様ナコトノナイコトヲ保證スル。」

松岡氏ハ断言シテ云フニハ自分ノ政策ハ平和維持ヲ目的トスルムデアリ  
ル。「三國同盟條約ノ運用範圍カナ「ソ」連ヲ除外シタノモ如上ノ理由  
ニ基クモノデ「ソ」連政府ニ不安ノ念ヲ起サセナイタノデアル。「ア  
リカ」ガ戦争ノ域外ニ立ツコトヲ吾々が切望スルノモコノ理由カラデアル」  
彼レ松岡氏ハ俗モ自己ノ見タ幻影ニ惑サレテキルカノ如ク冥想的  
度デ半バー人言ノヨウニ云ツタ。

「勿論日米兩國ガ協力事ニ當ルコトガ出スルトスレバ我々ハ世界ヲ支配  
スルコトガ出スルノダガ」ト。



Excerpt from TOKYO RECORD, by Otto D. Tolischus,  
1943, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York

Page. 56,

March 11, (1941)

Simultaneously, Matsuoka announced his immediate departure for Berlin and Rome; with a "probable" visit to Moscow. The purpose of his trip, said an official communique, was to "exchange personal salutations with and meet the leaders of Germany and Italy in connection with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact," and to "make personal observations of the European situation on the spot." But the important nature of the trip was emphasized by a liaison conference between the Government and the Imperial Headquarters on the whole international situation. And my guess, put down in a week-end dispatch on the trip, was that Matsuoka's visit to Moscow, where Japan was trying to get a nonaggression pact to protect her flank, provided "one of the most important clues to the significance of the trip."

For seventy-two hours earlier the American Congress had passed the Lend-Lease Act, and in the Japanese view, as expressed in the press, this bill "heralded America's appearance in the role of a formidable naval, air, and military Power in the Pacific, collaborating with Great Britain to obstruct Axis plans for a new world order." No, the crisis was not over; but the fires were banked for the moment.



辯護側文書 一六九八一〇

オットー・デュー、トリシユス「東京レコード」抜萃

一九四三年昭和十八年 ニューヨーク、レイナル、アンド、ヒツチュック

第五九頁

一九四一年昭和十六年三月十一日

同時に松岡はベルリンとローマへ、そして「多分」モスコーをも訪問すべく直ちに出發する旨發表した。公報に依れば彼の旅行の目的は「三國同盟の締結に關聯して獨逸及イタリーの首腦者と會つて個人的な挨拶を交換する」爲と、「ヨーロッパ現地情勢を親しく觀察する」爲である。併し右旅行の重要性は國際情勢全般に關する政府大本營連絡會議に依つて強調された。そして私の推測したところでは、旅行に關する週末の急信に書留めた様に、松岡のモスコー訪問は、日本は同地においてその側面を護る爲に不可侵條約を結ばんとしてゐたのであるが、「右旅行の意義について最も重要な手掛りの一つ」を與へたのである。

これより七十二時間前に米國議會は武器賣與法を可決してゐた。そし

Def. Doc. #16980

て新聞紙上に表明された如く、日本側の見解に依れば、本法案は「樞軸側の世界新秩序建設計畫を妨害する爲英國との合作の下に、米國が大平洋に於ける恐るべき海陸空軍の役割を以て登場して來たことの先觸れ」であつた。否、危機は去つたのではなく、差當り火がつけられたのである。

Excerpt from TOKYO RECORD, by Otto D. Tolischus,  
1943, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York

Pages 56, 57

March 13, (1941)

With a great blare of publicity, Matsuoka departed on his trip to Europe last night. Before leaving, he was received by the Emperor and Empress. Konoye and his Cabinet were at the station shouting "Banzai!" as the train pulled out. Symbolically enough, it was stated in the press that Matsuoka carried the same cane with him he had used in Geneva when he took Japan out of the League of Nations.

\* \* \* \* \*

But many Japanese watched him go with mingled feelings. The Asahi credited him with pursuing a "virile diplomacy", but warned him to exercise "great prudence and mature consideration", and under no circumstances to exceed the "Imperial wish and command for the restoration of peace" laid down in the Imperial Rescript about the Triple Alliance Pact. The equally conservative Chugai Shogyo warned that "prudence and caution" were called for, lest harm be done to Japan. Considering what had happened to other countries whose statesmen had visited Berlin, I could understand the concern. And I was interested in noting that while Berlin announced that Matsuoka was coming in response to Hitler's invitation, there was no mention of such an invitation in Japan. On the contrary, the Japanese underlined that Matsuoka was acting on his own initiative, and that the trip had been planned at the conclusion of the Triple Alliance.

読測文書第一六九八号

オットー・トリスチャスの「東京レコード」よりの抄萃

一九四三年（昭和十八年）ニューヨーク、レイノールド・ヒッチコック社出版

三六、五七頁 一九四一年（昭和十六年）三月十三日

島物入りで松岡は昨夜歐洲への旅に出発した。出発に先立ち天皇、皇后兩陛下に拝謁を賜はつた。近衛及び各閣僚は驛頭に見送り、列車がすべり出すと高才を叩んだ。松岡は日本を國際聯盟より脱退せしめた時ジュネーブで使用してゐたと同じステッキを携えてゐたと新聞は報じてゐるがたしかに象徴的である

Def. Doc. # 1698-D

しかし日本人の中には松岡の出発を高感交々の氣持を懷いて見つめたものが多かつた。朝日新聞は彼の外交旅りを賞して「男らしき外交」といつてゐるがしかし又一面彼が充分なる慎重熟慮をなすよう、そして又如何なる事態が生じようとも三國同盟協定に關する勅語の中に示された「平和回復の聖旨及び勅命」を越えないよう警告してゐる



朗日と同様保守的新聞たる「中外商業」も又日本に對し害を招く事なき  
様慎重と用心を要すると警告を發してゐる。外國の政治家のベルリン訪問  
によりその點々に今まで生じた事柄を考察してみた時私は此等の警告を發  
してゐる點を了解する事が出來た。私は松岡氏がヒットラーの招請に應じ  
て敢獨するとのベルリンの發表に對し日本側ではかかる招請の點には何等  
言及してゐない事に大いに關心を持つた。之に反し日本側では松岡の行動  
は彼の聲望によるものでありその訪獨旅行は三國同盟締結に際してすでに  
計畫されてゐたものであると強調してゐる

Excerpt from TOKYO RECORD, by Otto D. Tolischus,  
1943, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York

Page 94,95

April 12, (1941)

The Japanese press published a remarkable interview with Konoye today. He said that Japan would continue to work with Germany and Italy to establish a new world order, but that Japan's aims were peaceful and economic, that "at present" she had no intention of using armed force against the southern countries, and that "for the present" he did not expect any events of a remarkable character. He declared:

"American-Japanese relations are not necessarily bad. So long as Japan is a member of the Axis and bears the burden of China, the United States must be expected to tighten its economic restrictions against Japan. But I think there will be a limit to such pressure. One of the aims of the Tripartite Pact (with Germany and Italy) is to prevent the United States from participating in the European war. If it doesn't understand this point, well . . . But we must induce the United States to understand it. Admiral Nomura is striving precisely to make this point understood."

辯護側文章

オットー・D・トリスシユスの「東京記録」の抜萃

一九四三年（昭和十八年）  
レイナル・ヒイチコツク社出版

九四、九五頁

一九四一年（昭和十六年）四月十二日

日本の新聞は本日近衛との注目すべき見談を發表した。近衛の述べた所に依れば「日本は世界の新秩序を立の爲獨伊と共同して仕事をせらるであらう。しかし日本の意圖は平和的、經濟的のものにして「現在のところ」日本は南方の國々に對し武力を行使する意圖は何等有してゐない。そして又「當分の間は」或る注目すべき性質を有する事件を豫想してゐない」又「日米關係は必ずしも悪いものではない。日本が樞軸の一翼であり、又支那といふ負擔を有する限り、米國は日本に對し經濟的抑壓を強化するものゝ必要を感じなければならぬ。然し乍らアメリカのかゝる壓迫には限度があるものと思ふ。三國協定（獨伊との）の目的の一つはアメリカをして歐洲戰爭に参加するを防止するにある。若しアメリカが此の點を理解しなければ——」



しかしながら我々としてはアメリカをしてこの事を是非とも理解せしめなければならぬ。  
野村大使は正にこの點を理解せしめるべく勢力をはらひつゝあるのである。  
と断言した。



Excerpt from TOKYO RECORD, by Otto D. Tolischus,  
1943, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York

Pages 96, 97, 98

April 14, (1941)

Early this morning, Konoye announced to the nation that Japan and Russia had concluded a Neutrality Pact. They pledged themselves "to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect their territorial integrity and inviolability. . . Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities of one or several third Powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict." It did not matter which side attacked first, Japan could stay neutral in case of a Russo-German war. Russia further pledged herself to respect the territorial integrity of Manchukuo, thereby virtually recognizing it, and Japan agreed to the extension of Bolshevism in Asia by assuming a like pledge regarding Outer Mongolia's "People's Republic", which was virtually part of the Soviet Union.

"It is my firm belief", said Konoye, "that the pact has an epoch making significance in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, and that it will greatly contribute toward the promotion of world peace."

But I had to think of what a Russo-German pact had done to Europe. And the Pacific situation was similar. It looked so similar to me, and the Japanese reaction was such, that I wrote:

"Some of the Japanese interpretations of the pact are so sweeping that they hold the danger of inciting public opinion to a point where it may begin to force the Government's hand, and may tempt some of the more "dynamic" elements into precipitant action."

The entire press hailed the pact as a blow to the United States, and the Nichi Nichi bluntly declared that Japan could now avoid a two-front war; that is, fighting both the United States and Russia in case of a positive advance of her southward policy and a crisis in the Pacific.

But the press also represented the pact as a triumph of "Axis" diplomacy and welcomed Russia into the Axis camp. Russia, it argued, having recognized Japan's leadership in "Greater East Asia", was preparing to join in a new partition of the world and to stake out her own sphere of influence in Central Asia and the Near East. Was this genuine or disingenuous? I could not tell.

According to the Japanese press, Matsuoka's departure from Moscow produced a remarkable scene of German-Russian-Japanese fraternization. Stalin himself appeared at the railroad station and said to Matsuoka, "We shall go together along the same road."

Def. Doc. 1693-F

Stalin was also very friendly with the German Ambassador, Herr von der Schulenburg, and put his arms around the German military attache, Colonel Krebs, saying, "We shall remain friends."

In any case, I wrote:

"Japan is now expected to start a great diplomatic offensive to end hostilities in China and push the establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."

Her northern flank was secure.

辯護側文書

オットー、デイー、トリシユス著

一九四三年（昭和十八年）ニューヨーク、レイナール、  
ヒッチイコック社出版

「東京記録」抜萃

第九六、九七、九八頁

一九四一年（昭和十六年）四月十四日

今早朝近衛は日本とロシアが中立條約を締結したことを國民に發表した。二國は「兩國間の平和的友好的關係を維持し、相互にその領土保全と不可侵性とを尊重すべきを約束した。（中略）」

萬一契約國の一方が一箇又は數箇の第三國の戰爭の對象國となりたる場合は、他の契約國は戰爭繼續中終始中立を守る。何れの側が先に攻撃したかは問題でなく、日本は獨斷戰爭の場合中立に留ることが出來た。ロシアは更に滿洲國の領土保全を尊重することを約束し、以て同國を實質的に承認した。又日本は事實上はソヴェエツト連邦の一部である外



蒙古人民共和國に就て同様の約束をなし、以てアジアに於けるボルシェヴィズムの伸張に同意した。

「私は此の條約が日ソ關係に劃期的重要性を持つものであり、世界平和の促進に貢獻する處が大であらうと確信するものである。」と近衛は述べた。

然し私は獨露條約が歐洲に役立つたものが何であつたかを考慮せねばならなかつた。然も太平洋の狀勢は之に似通つて居た。私には非常に類似してゐる様に見えた。そして日本の反響は次に述べる様なものであつた。

「條約に關する日本人の解釋は色々あるがそのうちの或るものは非常に急進的であるので輿論が政府をして余儀なくかくし手を出させ始め、もつと行動的な一部分子をして輕卒な行動を採らしめるかも知れぬ程度に迄輿論を使喚する危険を孕んでゐる。」

全新開界は同條約を米國に對する一撃だとして歓迎した。日日新聞の如きは日本は今や兩面作戰を避けることが出来る。即ち日本の南方政策



を積極的に推進し、そして大太平洋に危険状態の惹起する場合に米國とロシアとを相手にして戦ふことはなくなる。と放言した。

然し、新聞は又同條約を「樞軸」外交の勝利として表示し、ロシアが樞軸陣營に参加することを歓迎した。「ロシアは大東亞に於ける日本の指導權を承認して、目下世界の新分割に参劃し、中アジア並に近東に自己の勢力權を擴張する準備中である。」と新聞は論じた。本心からさう思つてゐたか、殊に一物持つてさう云つたのか、私には判らなかつた。

日本の新聞に依ると、松岡がモスコーを出發する際、獨ソ日親善の注目すべき場面が見られた由である。スターリン自身驛頭に姿を現はし、松岡に「我々は同じ道を共に進むでせう」と述べた。スターリンは又ドイツ大使ヘル、フオン、デ、シユレンベルグとも非常に親しくし、そしてドイツ大使館附武官クレブス大佐を腕でかきだく様にして「我々は今後も依然親友でありませう」と云つた。

何時も私は次の様に書いた。

「日本は中國に於ける戰闘を終止せしめ、大東亞共榮圈の確立を促す

Def. Doc. #1698 F

爲、今や一大外交攻勢をとらうとしてゐる様に期待される。」  
日本の北方側面は心配無用であつた。

Excerpt from TOKYO RECORD, by Otto D. Tolischus,  
1943, Reynal & Hitchcock

September 14, (1941)

Chapter XXXII

On the other hand, the Japanese did not trust the Germans any more than other foreigners. In fact, they had arrested one of the most prominent Axis correspondents, Richard Sorge of the Frankfurter Zeitung, a close personal friend of Ott's. The current report was that he was being accused of espionage for Soviet Russia, which sounded improbable. The version brought to me was that he was arrested with a group of some thirty Japanese activists whom he had contacted on orders from the Nazis to spur their efforts toward plunging Japan into the war on the side of Germany, which sounded more reasonable. But nobody knew for certain. And that was not exactly reassuring for any correspondent (Later, Ott's personal secretary was arrested as well.)

オットー、D、トリスチャス、「東京報告」抜萃

一九四三年、レイノルーヒツチコック出版

九月十四日（一九四一年昭和十六年）

### 第三十二章

他方、日本人がドイツ人に信を措かざる事他の外國人に對すると何等變りない。事實、彼等日本人は、オットーの親友であり、優秀な樞軸側通信員である「フランクフルト時報」のリヒアルト、ゾルゲを逮捕した。現在普通に行はれて居る報道では、彼がソ聯邦の間諜であつたと云はれて居るが、之は有り得る事とは思はれない。私の所へ届いた一説によれば、彼は日本の行動派約三十名の一團と共に捕へられたが彼は、ドイツに味方して日本を戦争に突入せしめる爲、これらの日本人を教唆せよとのナチスからの命令によつて彼等と交際して居たのであつたといふ。この方が理由として、より尤もな事と思へる。だが誰も確實な所は知らないのである。

この事件は、いかなる通信員にも十分なる安全感を與へるものではない。（後に到り、オットーの秘書も亦逮捕された）



Excerpt from TOKYO RECORD, by Otto D. Tolischus,  
1943, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York

Pages 102, 103

April 19, (1941)

I mentioned Kaneko's conversations with Theodore Roosevelt in the next week-end cable and then wrote:

"The records of these conversations, reposing in Japanese state archives, form to Japanese statesmen the legitimation of their present course, but in the Japanese view, a Monroe Doctrine implies that Japan can do as she pleases in the East. The program involves elimination of white domination in the East, or as the current slogan goes, "Liberation of the East from white capitalism." During the last war, Japan eliminated the German foothold in the East with the aid of the Allies. During this war, Japan hopes to eliminate the British and other European strongholds with the aid of Germany. If, after the war, and in case of victory, Germany should attempt to become heir to the European possessions in the East, Japan will turn against her as well. For the present, Japan is proceeding on the theory that Germany will win, and that as a result, the world will be divided into four or five regional blocs or Lebensraume: an Afro-European bloc under Germany and Italy; the Americas under the United States; a Soviet bloc, extending to Central Asia and the Near East; perhaps, if Britain makes a compromise peace, a British Empire bloc; and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan."

Before I left, Kaneko promised to visit me at the Imperial Hotel. He never did. (He died May 16, 1942, aged eighty-nine).

オットーD、トリスチヤス「東京記録」抜萃

一九四三年ニューヨーク、レイノル・ヒツチコック出版

一〇二、一〇三頁

四月十九日（一九四一年昭和十六年）

私は金子とセオドル、ルーズベルト會談についてその次の週末電報に述べてついで次の如く記した。

日本政府の記録所に保管されてゐる之等會談の記録は日本の政治家達に彼等の現在の行き方の正當性を許容するとされてゐるが、日本人の考へでは例へばモンロー主義の如きは日本が東洋に於て任意に行動し得る意味を含んで居るのである。

日本人の計画中には東洋に於ける白人支配排斥、換言すれば現下のスローガンの如く「白人資本主義から東洋を解放する」事が含まれて居る。

前大戦時、日本は聯合國の援助により東洋に於けるドイツの足場を

排除した。今次大戦に於ては日本は、ドイツの援助により英國其他歐洲諸國の要塞を排除しようと望んで居る。若しもドイツが戦勝を得て戦後に歐洲諸國の東洋に於ける屬領の承繼者たらんと企てるならば日本はまたも同じやうにドイツに敵對するであらう。

目下の所、日本は、ドイツが勝利を得、且、その結果、世界が四乃至五の地域的ブロック即ち生活圏に分たれるといふ見解に基き行動して居る。此の地域的ブロックには即ち、獨伊のアフリカ、ヨーロッパ、ロック合衆國の下における南北アメリカ中央亞細亞及び（若し英國が妥協的平和を爲すとすれば）悉く近東亞細亞にまで擴張せるソヴィエツト、ブロック、英帝國ブロック、そして更に日本指導下の大東亞共榮圈である。

私の出發前に金子伯は、帝國ホテルに私を訪問すると約したが彼は訪問しなかつた。（彼は一九四二年五月十六日八十九歳で死んでゐる）